Propiedades como portadoras del valor intrínseco
Palabras clave:
portador del valor intrínseco, nominalismo de semejanza, realismo, universales, estados de cosasResumen
En este trabajo se reflexionará sobre la teoría del valor intrínseco, el problema del portador (bearer) de dicho valor y la importancia e influencia de las diversas teorías metafísicas de propiedades en su definición. Primero, se establecerán los elementos fundamentales de esta teoría, con énfasis en la discusión relativa al portador; segundo, se revisarán algunas teorías de metafísica de propiedades, destacando su concepción de la naturaleza de las propiedades y de la particularidad, luego, se analizarán las dificultades y fortalezas de asumir una ontología de propiedades determinada para caracterizar el portador del valor intrínseco. Y, finalmente, se argumentará a favor de una concepción esencialista científica para caracterizar el portador del valor intrínseco.
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