Commentary on chapter III: The Deontological Concept of Right and its Implications with Regard to a Theory of Duty
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.53382/issn.2452-445X.928Keywords:
Kant, Horn, Hoffe, Rights, Freedom, Human RightsAbstract
In this work the author analyzes chapter III of Christoph Horn’s book Nichtidelale Normativität. Against Horn’s negative position towards the possibility of basing human rights on Kant’s philosophy of right, it will be argued, following Otfried Höffe’s line of thought and relying on Habermas’ thought, that by means of native right to freedom Kant does indeed ground sufficiently the existence of first-generation human rights.
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References
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