Keywords
correspondentism
epistemology
pluralism
truth ciencias humanas
correspondentismo
epistemología
pluralismo
verdad
How to Cite
Abstract
Because of its lack of definition, the Human Sciences are prone to include views close to post-truth, without subjecting them to scrutiny. This paper explores the question of whether knowledge in Human Sciences could renounce the search for truth, and, if so, whether it would preserve its nature of knowledge despite it being relative, subjective, and irrational. I claim that it is not necessary to fall into relativism, subjectivism, or irrationalism in the Human Sciences and that a concept of Truth which preserves their specificity is possible. To support this claim, I begin by first reconstructing some recent polemics about realism and anti-realism in the Human Sciences. Second, I explore the Pluralist Theory of Truth, especially the Correspondence Pluralism. I conclude by showing how to overcome some tensions that we perceive in epistemological discussions about the Human Sciences.
References
Aguirre, Juan. “La posibilidad de la objetividad en ciencias humanas”. Cinta de Moebio, n.º 67, 2020, pp. 1-13, www.cintademoebio.uchile.cl.
Aristóteles. Metafísica. Madrid: Gredos, 2013. Ball, James. Post-Truth. How Bullshit conquered the world. Londres: Biteback, 2017.
Boghossian, Paul. El miedo al conocimiento. Contra el relativismo y el constructivismo. Madrid: Alianza, 2009.
Daston, Lorraine. “Objectivity and Impartiality. Epistemic virtues in the Humanities”. The Making of the Humanities, Volume III: The Modern Humanities. Editado
por Rens Bod, Jaap Maat y Thijs Weststeijn. Ámsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2014, pp. 27-42.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Introducción a las ciencias del espíritu. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1966.
Ferraris, Maurizio. Manifiesto del nuevo realismo. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2013.
Feyerabend, Paul. Farewell to Reason. Nueva York: Verso, 1988.
Foucault, Michel. Les mots et les choses. París: Gallimard, 1966.
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Sobre el concepto de bullshit”. La importancia de lo que nos preocupa. Buenos Aires: Katz, 2006, pp. 171-94.
Gabriel, Markus. Por qué el mundo no existe. Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, 2017.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Verdad y método II. Salamanca: Sígueme, 2002.
Gaukroger, Stephen. Objectivity. A very short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012.
Glasersfeld, Ernst von. “Farewell to objectivity”. Systems Research, vol. 13, n.º 3, 1996, pp. 279-86.
Grondin, Jean. ¿Qué es la hermenéutica? Barcelona: Herder, 2008.
Heidegger, Martin. What is called Thinking. Nueva York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Lemos, Noah. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.
Lynch, Michael. Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009
Nicolás, Juan y María Frápolli, editores. Teorías contemporáneas de la verdad. Madrid: Tecnos, 2012.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Fragmentos póstumos (1885-1889). Volumen IV. Madrid: Tecnos, 2008.
Pedersen, Nikolaj y Cory Wright. “Pluralist Theories of Truth”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html.
Pedersen, Nikolaj y Cory Wright. Truth and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013.
Rorty, Richard. Objetividad, relativismo y verdad. Escritos filosóficos I. Barcelona: Paidós, 1996.
Searle, John. La construcción de la realidad social. Barcelona: Paidós, 1997.
Sher, Gila. “Forms of Correspondence: the Intricate Route from Thought to Reality”. Truth and Pluralism. Editado por N. Pedersen y C. Wright. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013, pp. 157-79.
Stove, David. Popper and After. Four Modern Irrationalists. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982.
Vattimo, Gianni. Adiós a la verdad. Barcelona: Gedisa, 2010.
Wright, Crispin. Truth and Objectivity. Harvard: Harvard UP, 1994.
Wright, Georg von. Explanation and Understanding. Londres: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista de humanidades (Santiago. En línea)