Abstract
This work presents the current debate in Philosophy ofMathematics from the persperctive ofBenacerra·s structuralist stance. The view defended by Benacerraf is that what is importand about numbers is not thein indetification with sorne or other determinate object, but how they are related within a structure. First, the structuralist criticism of Benacerraf to the platonistic thesis defended by Frege and Russell (by which numbers are construed as objects) is evaluated. Then, the work will consider the platonistic- empiriscist solution put forward by Quine and Putnam, known as the "indispensabilíty argument". The paper finishes with Maddy·s criticism to the indispernsability argument.
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