Knowledge as a mechanic response to the environment, attachment, and reflexivity

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Keywords

contemporary epistemology
Hilary Kornblith
Ernest Sosa
animal knowledge
human knowledge epistemología contemporánea
Hilary Kornblith
Ernest Sosa
conocimiento animal
conocimiento humano

How to Cite

Alarcón Zambrano, N. O., and F. A. Álvarez Osorio. “Knowledge As a Mechanic Response to the Environment, Attachment, and Reflexivity: An Alternative to the Debate Between the Epistemological Approaches of Kornblith and Sosa”. Revista De Humanidades (Santiago. En línea), no. 43, Jan. 2021, pp. 265-91, https://revistahumanidades.unab.cl/index.php/revista-de-humanidades/article/view/5.

Abstract

In this paper we intend to explain how the criteria of delimitation between animal knowledge and human knowledge in contemporary epistemology are not adequate to exhaust the epistemological complexity of the phenomenon that constitutes knowledge to establish a third way of interpreting this phenomenon. In turn, a taxonomy of levels that satisfy the needs of classification of animal knowledge will be proposed without neglecting the particularity of human knowledge, namely, reflexivity. In this way, we intend to reinterpret how animal knowledge has been conceived in contemporary epistemology in order to reconstruct, from the mentioned positions, an alternative way that appropriately accounts for the particularities of animal knowledge in relation to human knowledge

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Copyright (c) 2021 Revista de humanidades (Santiago. En línea)

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