Inconsisthesis

Abstract

In a precritical text of 1763, Kant argues that “the concept of position or positing [Position oder Setzung] is completely simple and is the same as the concept of Being”. Werner Hamacher identifies in these lines the fundamental formulation of modern metaphysics understood as “ontotheseology”, i.e. the
determination of being as position, positing, or thesis, which he demonstrates entails an unspeakable and originary aporia—the aporia of positing. This aporia is concomitant with a structural inconsistency, which I term inconsisthesis, that affects not only transcendental subjectivity but also the concept of sovereignty. Sovereign inconsisthesis is the subject of this article. To address it, I flesh out the difficult logic of inconsisthesis by turning to Hamacher’s account of the linguistic act of “promising”, which he understands as the paradoxical premise of positing in general, since promising only makes possible a positing act by interrupting it. In light of the linguistic character of both positing and its aporia disclosed in the originary act of promising, the article
pursues sovereign inconsisthesis in the notion of “linguistic justice” (Sprachgerechtigkeit) that Hamacher mobilizes in his reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy.