Keywords
Capacity
Potentiality
Actuality
Process
Change Actualismo
Capacidad
Potencialidad
Actualidad
Proceso
Cambio
How to Cite
Abstract
This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s refutation of Megarian actualism in Metaphysics IX. 3. It argues that the arguments presented here, besides taking advantage of the explanatory failures of Megarian actualism and its contravention of common sense, exhibit a unitary structure in so far as they gradually reveal actualism’s systematic failure to recognize transitional processes between actual states of the world.
References
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