The justification of Habermas’s discourse ethics: between logic and history

Abstract

Jürgen Habermas develops a moral philosophy related to the Kantian tradition. This heritage can be seen in the characteristics that constitute his moral point of view, since it is formalist, cognitivist, universalist and procedural. In terms of the justification of the moral principle, Habermas points out that it depends on a strategy of logical derivation from two premises: a weak idea of normative justification and the rules of rational discourse. However, he never developed this derivation, and finally he is inclined to maintain that the justification is only possible from a historical argument. This component indicates that modern subjects have a commitment to resolve their conflicts through deliberation. Thus, the question arises as to whether the incorporation of this argument does not imply an abandonment of Kant, who sought to base morality beyond the contingent and historical. The article argues that in the doctrine of the “fact of reason” Kant elaborates an argument similar to the one developed by Habermas. In addition, it shows that, despite the historical character of the justification of the moral principle, this in any case rests on a Kantian notion of autonomy. From these two arguments, it can be concluded that Habermas would not be abandoning Kant as some of his commentators maintain.