On Aristotle’s Claim: “We Deliberate not about Ends but about Means”
Keywords:
Aristotle, Deliberation, Practical Reason, Theory of Action, PhronesisAbstract
Aristotle’s claim that “we deliberate not about ends but about means” has led to an extensive discussion about how to understand it within the Aristotelian theory of action, so as to avoid certain systematically dissonant conclusions which may be derived from a light reading of it. The article presents three difficulties that could arise as a result of this claim, presenting two basic lines of interpretation that have tried to save at least some of them. A number of distinctions are explained, leading to raise the claim that the reflections on the content of happiness belong originally to the practical level (i.e, volitional) of deliberation. Finally, a solution to the difficulties is offered and an autonomous and synthetic position concerning the exposed interpretative lines is taken.
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