Naturalistic Fallacy and Theoretical Reason. A Systematic Approach to the Problem of Normativity in Hume’s thought
Keywords:
Naturalistic Fallacy, Is-ough, Hume, General Rules, EpistemologyAbstract
This article explores a refreshing interpretation of the “isought- pasage” in Hume’s third book of the Treatise. Such interpretation heavily relies on pondering the consequences that the argument would imply for Hume’s epistemology. Indeed, the traditional interpretation of the passage involves relevant inconsistencies both in Hume’s practical and theoretical philosophy, since at both stages it becomes necessary to account for Hume’s normative claims and their importance. The interpretation advanced in this writing supports the idea that the “is-ought passage” is far from denying the possibility of deriving normative claims from facts, but rather that it sets constrains on the way in which such derivation is conceivable.
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