Abstract
In this work I will reflect upon the theory of intrinsic value, the problem of the bearer of such value and the importance and influence of the metaphysical theories of properties in its definition. First, I will expose the core elements of this theory,
regarding the debate related to the bearer. Secondly, I will briefly show the different alternatives in metaphysics of properties, considering its conception of the nature of properties and of the particular. Thirdly, I will analyze some of the difficulties of assuming certain metaphysics of properties for characterizing the bearer of intrinsic value. Finally, I shall argue for a scientific essentialist conception for characterizing the bearer of intrinsic value.
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