Do things in themselves ground appearances? Against a General Causal Reading

Abstract

In the current discussion of transcendental idealism, the “metaphysical turn” widely assumes that the proposition “things in themselves ground appearances” is a general description of causal interaction that every interpretation must explain. This paper challenges this stance, arguing that such a claim rests on a decontextualized reading of Kant's text. By treating texts as a continuum without specific context, crucial differences in terminology are ignored, leading to erroneous univocal interpretations. To illustrate this, I will use the cases of Watkins and Rosefeldt, showing how their reading disregards textual specificities. Next, I will address a possible objection derived from the text of ÜE 08:215. I will conclude by highlighting the advantages of my analysis: first, the necessity of analyzing the proposition within specific textual contexts; second, the possibility of distinguishing two strata in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) regarding the use of the critical distinction and the term "thing in itself." This allows for a more precise approach to interpretive problems related to transcendental idealism and the critical distinction between appearance and thing in itself.